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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Michael Dent appeals his conviction for conspiracy to 
distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 841(b), 
alleging that both his conviction and sentence rest on 
legally insufficient evidence. Dent also argues that the 
prosecution's delay in bringing his case to trial violated the 
Sixth Amendment and the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers Act, and that the district court should have 
permitted him to review the personnel file of his arresting 
officer. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Dent's case has a long and dramatic history, which need 
be recounted only briefly for purposes of this appeal. On 
January 19, 1992, Philadelphia police officers Stephen 
Cassidy and Dathon Enoch pursued a suspected drug 
dealer into a local residence. Inside they found Dent and 
two other men seated at a table cluttered with cocaine base 
and drug paraphernalia. The officers arrested Dent and his 
companions, as well as the suspected drug dealer who led 
them to the house. The federal prosecutor took over Dent's 
case from the Philadelphia authorities, but Dent jumped 
bond and fled the jurisdiction before federal agents could 
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arrest him. Because of Dent's fugitive status, delay on the 
government's part and Dent's intervening incarceration in 
New York state for unrelated crimes, he was not tried on 
federal narcotics charges until February 1997, although a 
grand jury indicted him on April 22, 1992. A jury convicted 
Dent of one count of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, 
but acquitted him of a related count for possession of a 
controlled substance. As punishment, he now faces 92 
months' imprisonment to be followed by a five-year period 
of supervised release. 
 
Dent's appeal raises numerous challenges to his 
conviction and sentence. First, he alleges that the 
government's delay in bringing his case to trial violated the 
Sixth Amendment's speedy trial provision and the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers Act ("IAD"), 18 U.S.C. app. S 2. 
Second, he claims that Officer Cassidy's testimony was 
insufficient to prove his participation in a conspiracy to 
distribute crack because the officer could not recall seeing 
Dent personally handle any drugs or drug paraphernalia. 
Next, Dent alleges that the district court should not have 
admitted the cocaine base at trial, since the government 
failed to establish a reliable chain of custody for the exhibit. 
He further argues that the government did not demonstrate 
that the drugs were crack rather than another form of 
cocaine base, and that consequently he may not be 
sentenced under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
("U.S.S.G.") S 2D1.1, which imposes a far harsher penalty 
for crack offenses than is applied to crimes involving equal 
quantities of cocaine in other forms. Dent also insists that 
the district court should have permitted him to review 
Cassidy's personnel file, and that had it done so, he could 
have cast doubt on the officer's credibility as a witness. 
Finally, Dent attacks his sentence on the ground that the 
government used an unreliable method to determine the 
amount of crack involved in his crime. We will consider 
each of these arguments in turn. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction over the district 
court's order under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and over the final 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a). 
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II. 
 
We consider first Dent's contention that a prejudicial pre- 
trial delay violated both his Sixth Amendment right to a 
speedy trial and the IAD. We review the district court's legal 
conclusions de novo, but will reverse factual findings only 
if they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Bierley, 
922 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
A. 
 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. However, "[u]ntil 
there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, 
there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors" 
relevant to whether a pre-trial delay prejudiced the 
defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
Here, the approximately five-year delay between Dent's 
arrest and his trial is sufficiently lengthy to trigger full 
inquiry into the possibility that Dent suffered prejudice as 
a result. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 
n.1, 658 (1992) (observing that most courts find a 
postaccusation delay "presumptively prejudicial" at least as 
it approaches one year); Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 
760 (3d Cir. 1993) (fourteen and one-half month delay 
warrants full inquiry into possible prejudice resulting from 
postponement of trial). 
 
Once the defendant identifies a presumptively prejudicial 
delay in bringing his case to trial, determining whether that 
delay violated the Sixth Amendment requires a highly fact- 
specific analysis that balances all the relevant 
circumstances. In conducting this balancing test, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized four factors: (1) the length 
of the delay, (2) the reasons for delay, (3) whether, in due 
course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial 
and (4) the actual prejudice the defendant suffered as a 
result. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Although we begin our 
analysis with these four factors, we are mindful that none 
is "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding 
of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial," and that we 
must consider them together "with such other 
circumstances as may be relevant." Id. 
 
                                4 
  
Although the first of the Barker factors, the length of the 
delay, weighs somewhat in Dent's favor, it is not 
compelling. Certainly the gap between Dent's January 19, 
1992 arrest and his trial on February 3 and 4, 1997 is 
substantial. However, the seriousness of a postaccusation 
delay varies depending on the circumstances, and a waiting 
period during which the defendant is not detained presents 
fewer concerns than a wait accompanied by pretrial 
incarceration. See id. at 533 (noting serious societal 
disadvantages caused by pretrial incarceration). Dent did 
not endure any significant pretrial detention associated 
with the conviction from which he appeals. We therefore do 
not find the length of the pretrial delay in his case to be 
intolerable. 
 
More important, Dent's claim stumbles on the second 
Barker factor, which requires us to consider whether Dent 
or the government caused the delay. Although both parties 
contributed to the post-indictment delay, it is clear that 
Dent bears the bulk of responsibility in this regard. After 
his arrest, Dent jumped bond and remained a fugitive for 
more than two years. He was listed as a wanted person on 
April 30, 1992 after failing to appear at a state court 
hearing, and, despite diligent efforts, federal agents could 
not locate him until August 1994. Dent argues that he is 
not to blame for this part of the delay, because federal 
agents had not yet arrested him when he fled, and thus he 
did not know of the federal indictment. This argument is 
specious. Dent may not have known that his case had been 
adopted by federal prosecutors, but he certainly knew that 
he had been arrested by Philadelphia police and released 
on bond, and that proceedings had commenced against him 
in state court. As a result, Dent was fully aware of his 
fugitive status when he fled to New York sometime in early 
1992. 
 
Inexplicably, after learning that Dent was incarcerated in 
New York, the government waited fourteen months before 
taking further steps to bring him to justice. Beginning 
October 17, 1995, however, the prosecution consistently 
sought to have Dent tried in Pennsylvania. On that date, 
prosecutors wrote to the U.S. Marshal Service requesting 
that Dent's arrest warrant be lodged as a detainer with the 
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correctional facility where Dent purportedly was 
incarcerated, only to learn that no inmate named Michael 
Dent was then in residence at that institution. This 
confusion was not resolved until April 1996, when the 
government discovered that Dent was being held at a 
different New York correctional institution under his real 
name, Isaac Dennis. On April 26, 1996, the government 
again wrote to the U.S. Marshal Service requesting that 
Dent's outstanding federal arrest warrant be lodged as a 
detainer, this time with the correct New York facility. 
 
Thus, Dent is wholly responsible for the first 26 months 
of the pre-trial delay, and the government is to blame for 
only 14 months of that delay. Although an additional 13 
months passed before Dent's trial, the government cannot 
be faulted for this lag. By all accounts, the United States 
Attorney's office sedulously attempted to locate Dent in the 
New York penal system after October 17, 1995. Indeed, it 
was Dent's use of an alias, not any neglect on the 
government's part, which largely caused the additional 
delay. 
 
The third Barker criterion--whether the defendant timely 
asserted the right to a speedy trial--also weighs against 
Dent's Sixth Amendment claim. Dent did not assert his 
right to a speedy trial until June 1996, more than four 
years after his arrest. Although Dent was unaware of the 
federal indictment until that date, he certainly knew that 
narcotics charges were pending against him in Philadelphia 
in connection with his prior arrest, and that he had left 
Pennsylvania just as criminal proceedings against him were 
beginning. Had Dent truly wished to expedite his trial, he 
would have remained in Pennsylvania to be tried, or at the 
very least maintained contact with authorities in that state. 
Moreover, he would not have given arresting officers an 
assumed name or allowed the state court to begin 
proceedings against him using the alias. 
 
The fourth element under Barker, prejudice to the 
accused, likewise does not indicate a violation of Dent's 
Sixth Amendment rights. Dent contends that the pretrial 
delay prejudiced his defense because witnesses could no 
longer remember important details. Further, Officer Enoch 
retired before Dent's trial and thus allegedly could not be 
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located to testify for the defense. Dent also claims that his 
mother, his stepfather and a codefendant, William Scott, all 
died before the trial and therefore could not testify in his 
defense. In addition, Dent alleges prejudice because he lost 
the opportunity to serve his present sentence concurrently 
with his incarceration in New York. 
 
None of these allegations of prejudice is convincing. First, 
the passage of time probably helped Dent's case by making 
Sergeant Cassidy's testimony less detailed and therefore 
less convincing. Indeed, one of Dent's principal arguments 
at trial was that Cassidy could not recollect seeing Dent 
personally handle any drugs or drug paraphernalia. 
Second, there is no reason to believe that Officer Enoch's 
testimony would have aided the defense. Moreover, Dent 
has not shown that he seriously attempted to locate Enoch 
for trial. Nor is it likely that William Scott could have 
offered any useful information not provided by Dent 
himself, because at all relevant times Scott and Dent were 
seated side-by-side at the crime scene and thus had the 
same opportunity to witness events. Finally, Dent's parents 
could not have provided a credible alibi, because Cassidy 
saw Dent at the crime scene and arrested him there. In any 
event, Dent's mother died in 1993, during the period of the 
delay attributable wholly to Dent's flight from the law. Thus 
Dent, not the government, should bear the burden of any 
loss of evidence caused by her unavailability. 
 
Of course, "excessive delay presumptively compromises 
the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove 
nor, for that matter, identify." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655. 
Thus "affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not 
essential to every speedy trial claim." Id. On the other hand, 
however, this presumptive prejudice certainly "cannot alone 
carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other 
Barker criteria." Id. Here, the presumptive prejudice from 
the government's fourteen month delay simply cannot 
outweigh the other Barker factors, which do not support a 
conclusion that Dent suffered prejudice from denial of a 
speedy trial. Accordingly, and because we find no other 
circumstances relevant to this analysis, we hold that the 
lag between Dent's arrest and trial did not violate the Sixth 
Amendment. 
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B. 
 
The IAD, which governs resolution of outstanding 
criminal charges against suspects serving sentences in 
other states, also fails to provide Dent a basis for relief. 
Under Article III(a) of the IAD, a defendant must be tried on 
outstanding criminal charges within 180 days after 
authorities receive his or her request for trial. See 18 U.S.C. 
app. S 2, art. III(a); Casper v. Ryan, 822 F.2d 1283, 1285 
(3d Cir. 1987). Furthermore, Article V(c) of the IAD requires 
that an indictment be dismissed with prejudice if trial is 
not commenced within that period. 18 U.S.C. app.S 2, art. 
V(c). 
 
On April 26, 1996, after finally locating Dent at Mid-State 
Correctional Facility ("Mid-State"), the United States 
Attorney initiated proceedings to secure Dent's return to 
Pennsylvania for trial under Article IV(a) of the IAD. That 
Article permits a prosecutor outside the jurisdiction where 
an inmate is incarcerated to lodge a detainer against the 
prisoner and procure his presence for trial on pending 
criminal charges. Meanwhile, on June 25, 1996, Dent sent 
a letter to the federal district court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania requesting a speedy resolution of his 
outstanding federal charges under the Interstate Agreement 
on Detainers. His letter did not reference Article III, 
however, and did not include the information which that 
Article states must accompany such a request. 
 
Dent claims that because the government received his 
letter requesting a speedy trial on July 23, 1996, Article III 
required the prosecution to initiate his trial on or before 
January 19, 1997. However, invocation of Article III's 180- 
day time limit generally requires strict compliance with the 
Article's requirements. Nash v. Jeffes, 739 F.2d 878, 884 
(3d Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., Carchman 
v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985). Thus the 180-day period 
does not begin until the inmate "shall have caused to be 
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate 
court . . . written notice of the place of his imprisonment 
and his request for a final disposition to be made of the 
indictment, information, or complaint." Article III(a). 
Additionally, the request "shall be accompanied by a 
certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the 
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prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the 
prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time 
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good 
time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, 
and any decision of the State parole agency relating to the 
prisoner." Id. Because Dent failed to satisfy these essential 
procedural requirements, we hold that his June 25, 1996 
letter did not start the clock for the government's 
compliance with Article III. Instead, the 180-day period 
began to run August 22, 1996 when the prosecution 
learned that Dent wished to proceed under IAD Article III, 
and did not expire until February 18, 1997, well after 
Dent's trial. 
 
Dent argues that the circumstances of his case require 
us to excuse his noncompliance with Article III. He points 
out that his June 25, 1996 letter invoked the IAD, the 
government already possessed most of the necessary 
information concerning his case and his noncompliance 
was solely the fault of the New York state penal authorities. 
Dent repeatedly asked authorities at Mid-State to provide 
him with IAD forms so that he might resolve the federal 
charges pending against him in Pennsylvania. Yet instead 
of supplying the necessary forms, the authorities 
erroroneously informed him that federal warrants "do not 
fall under the IAD," because it "is solely an agreement 
between states." They further advised Dent that he could 
expedite his trial by writing the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, but that he need 
"not fill out any papers." In doing so, the New York officials 
failed to satisfy Article III(c)'s mandate that"[t]he warden, 
commissioner of corrections, or other official having 
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the 
source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and 
shall also inform him of his right to make a request for final 
disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on 
which the detainer is based." 18 U.S.C. app. S 2, art. III(c). 
 
In Casper, 822 F.2d at 1293, we recognized that "[s]trict 
compliance with Article III may not be required when the 
prisoner has done everything possible, and it is the 
custodial state that is responsible for the default." We also 
explained, however, that an inmate seeking the benefit of 
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this exception nonetheless must "show that s/he 
substantially complied to the extent possible." Id. Dent's 
letter did not include his term of commitment, the time 
already served, the time remaining to be served on his 
sentence, or any information concerning good-time credits 
or parole eligibility as required under Article III. Nor does he 
claim that he could not have supplied these details. 
Instead, Dent notes that when the government received his 
letter on July 23, 1996, it had already obtained most of the 
necessary information through its own efforts to secure 
custody of Dent under Article IV.1 This fact is not 
dispositive. As we emphasized in Casper, the inmate's IAD 
request must contain sufficient information to alert the 
government that Article III has been invoked, without 
requiring the prosecution "to analyze each communication 
. . . with a fine-tooth comb to determine whether it should 
be construed as invoking the IAD." Nash, 739 F.2d at 884. 
Under the circumstances, Dent's letter simply was 
inadequate to alert the government that he sought to rely 
on Article III. To hold otherwise would "create`a trap for 
unwary prosecuting officials' and . . . defeat the underlying 
purpose of Article III's procedural requirements. . . ." 
Casper, 822 F.2d at 1292-93 (quoting Nash , 739 F.2d at 
884). 
 
III. 
 
We will review together Dent's various challenges to the 
sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction. We apply 
a particularly deferential standard of review when deciding 
whether a jury verdict rests on legally sufficient evidence. 
"It is not for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses." United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 
1050, 1080 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 
623 (1996) (citation omitted). Rather, we must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see 
United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 1997), 
and will sustain the verdict if " `any rational trier of fact 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Dent claims that as of July 23, 1996, the government had all of the 
information that Article III(a) requires him to supply, with the exception 
of details regarding good-time credits. See Appellant's Reply Br. at 8. 
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could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1080 
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 
Accord United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d 
Cir. 1987). Thus, "a claim of insufficiency of the evidence 
places a very heavy burden on an appellant." United States 
v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation 
omitted). 
 
The evidence against Dent consisted of testimony by 
Dent's arresting officer, statements of a forensic scientist 
who examined the drugs seized during Dent's arrest and 
the cocaine itself. Dent insists that none of this suffices to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he participated in a 
conspiracy to distribute crack. We disagree. 
 
A. 
 
Testimony from Dent's arresting officer, Sergeant 
Cassidy, provided the prosecution's principal evidence at 
trial. On the witness stand, Cassidy recounted the following 
events. While patrolling Sharswood Avenue in Philadelphia, 
he and Officer Dathon Enoch observed two men exchanging 
money for several small, unidentified objects. When Cassidy 
and Enoch approached, both men fled. Although the man 
who received the objects escaped, the other, later identified 
as Courtney Golden, entered 5411 Sharswood Avenue and 
attempted to close the door of the residence to prevent the 
officers from following him inside. The three men struggled 
for a moment in a tug-of-war, as Golden sought to keep the 
door shut, while Enoch and Cassidy tried to enter. Golden 
eventually abandoned his hold on the door, fleeing to the 
rear of the house and into the kitchen. Cassidy and Enoch 
pursued Golden into the kitchen where, in Cassidy's words, 
they 
 
       observed three males sitting at a table inside the 
       kitchen area with numerous drug items on the table. 
       There was a plate, there was a chunk of a -- an off- 
       white chunky substance. There were razor blades, 
       straw. There were vials, some were full. There were 
       vials in bags that were wrapped up and lined out . .. 
       in a straight line . . . about four or five of them. 
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Cassidy observed that "one of [the men] had a razor blade 
in his hand," and based on his fifteen years of experience 
investigating narcotics offenses, he concluded that the three 
men seated at the table, one of whom was Dent, were 
"bagging cocaine" for sale. Finally, Cassidy stated that 
Courtney Golden had cocaine in his coat pocket. 
 
In addition, Tanweer Ali, a forensic scientist from the 
Philadelphia Police Drug Laboratory, testified that she 
identified the substance seized from Dent as cocaine base 
by performing two tests: (1) a Scott's reagent test, which 
yielded positive results consistent with the presence of 
cocaine base, and (2) a gas chromatograph ion test, which 
also indicated the presence of cocaine. Ali also testified that 
the Scott Test is 99.9 percent accurate. 
 
We find this evidence sufficient to support a reasonable 
inference that Dent and his co-defendants conspired to 
distribute cocaine base. A conviction for conspiracy 
requires proof of "unity of purpose, the intent to achieve a 
common goal, and an agreement to work together toward 
that goal." United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 467 (3d 
Cir. 1997). The government must prove each element 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but may do so solely by 
circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Barrow, 363 
F.2d 62, 64 (3d Cir. 1966). A reasonable jury could infer 
from Dent's proximity to the drugs and paraphernalia, 
while at least one of the men seated beside him bagged the 
crack, that Dent and the other men conspired to distribute 
cocaine. See United States v. James, 40 F.3d 850, 867 (7th 
Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds sub nom., James v. 
United States, 516 U.S. 1022 (1995), modified on other 
grounds, 79 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1996) (defendant's presence, 
proximity and apparent participation during packaging of 
drugs for street sale sufficed to sustain conviction for drug 
distribution conspiracy, although arresting officer did not 
actually see defendant handle cocaine). A jury also 
reasonably could infer from Golden's actions outside the 
house, his flight into 5411 Sharswood Avenue and the 
presence of cocaine in his pockets that Golden had sold 
drugs as part of a conspiracy in which Dent participated. 
Dent's contention that the evidence also permits a less 
sinister conclusion is immaterial. "To sustain the jury's 
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verdict, the evidence does not need to be inconsistent with 
every conclusion save that of guilt." United States v. 
Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Dent's reliance on Thomas, supra, and United States v. 
Wexler, 838 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1988), is also misplaced. In 
those cases, we explained that a conviction for conspiracy 
to distribute a controlled substance requires evidence that 
the accused knew the conspiracy's purpose was to 
distribute contraband. See Thomas, 114 F.3d at 406 
(insufficient evidence that defendant participated in drug 
conspiracy absent proof that he knew the suitcase at issue 
contained drugs); Wexler, 838 F.2d at 92 (evidence 
insufficient to support drug conspiracy conviction absent 
proof that defendant who acted as a lookout knew he was 
facilitating hashish distribution). In contrast to Thomas and 
Wexler, here the evidence clearly supports the conclusion 
that Dent knew his accomplices intended to distribute 
cocaine base because he watched them package the drugs 
for sale. 
 
B. 
 
Dent also claims that the cocaine base was inadmissible 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 901, because the 
government failed to provide a reliable chain of custody. To 
establish a chain of custody, the government need only 
show that it took reasonable precautions to preserve the 
evidence in its original condition, even if all possibilities of 
tampering are not excluded. See United States v. Kelly, 14 
F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994). Absent actual evidence of 
tampering, a trial court may presume regularity in public 
officials' handling of contraband. See Kelly, 14 F.3d at 
1175; United States v. Jackson, 649 F.2d 967, 973-74 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 871 (1981). Unless the trial 
court clearly abused its discretion, we must uphold its 
decision to admit the cocaine base into evidence. See 
Jackson, 649 F.2d at 973. 
 
Here, Cassidy testified that he transported the drugs 
directly from the crime scene to the Narcotics Division and 
observed while laboratory personnel field tested the drugs 
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and assigned them an inventory number. Cassidy's 
testimony also clearly distinguished the drugs seized from 
codefendant Courtney Golden from those found on the 
table where Dent was seated at the time of his arrest. Thus, 
Dent's contention that police commingled the evidence with 
drugs taken from other defendants is insupportable. 
Moreover, the prosecution showed that the cocaine 
attributed to Dent remained in a locked storage bin and 
was removed only for laboratory testing and for 
presentation in court. At all times, the laboratory 
maintained a written record showing who handled the 
contraband and when. Although Dent identifies a few 
instances when the evidence was placed in a different 
storage bin without the change being entered into the 
record log, these discrepancies affect the weight of the 
evidence, not its admissibility. Moreover, it is clear that the 
drugs never left the lab except when transported for 
proceedings against Dent's co-conspirators. 
 
Nor is the evidence inadmissible because of a tear in the 
plastic bag holding the vials of cocaine base. The chemist 
testified that this tear could have resulted from handling or 
temperature exposure. Thus, without more, it is insufficient 
to require exclusion of the evidence. The chemist also 
stated that when she tested and weighed the drugs, the bag 
contained no tears. 
 
Finally, we do not place great significance on variations 
in the witnesses' descriptions of the cocaine. Cassidy's 
description of the contraband at trial as "an off white 
chunky substance" differs only slightly from that on the 
property receipt, which specifies "a white chunky substance 
wrapped in foil" and from Ali's statement that she tested 
"white chunky residue" on a foil-wrapped glass plate. These 
minor discrepancies can be attributed to the inevitable 
differences in human perception, and we will not require 
the police and laboratory chemists to use precisely the 
same words in referring to evidence before it may be 
admitted. 
 
IV. 
 
We turn next to Dent's claim that he should not have 
been sentenced under the crack enhancement provisions of 
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U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1, because the government failed to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the substance 
recovered during Dent's arrest was crack cocaine. We 
review for clear error the district court's finding that the 
substance found in Dent's presence was crack, reversing 
only if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made. See United States v. Roman, 121 
F.3d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Covington, 
133 F.3d 639, 643 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 
The crack enhancement provisions of Sentencing 
Guidelines S 2D1.1 apply only if the prosecution proves by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the cocaine-base 
involved satisfies the Guidelines' definition of crack. See 
United States v. James, 78 F.3d 851, 858 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 117 S. Ct. 128 (1996). That definition states that 
" `Cocaine base' for purposes of this guideline, means crack. 
`Crack' is the street name for a form of cocaine base, 
usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and 
sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, 
rocklike form." U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(c) (Note D) (1995). 
 
In Dent's case, although a chemist identified the 
contraband as cocaine base, she did not perform a test to 
determine whether it contained sodium bicarbonate, which 
Dent claims would be present in crack. Therefore, the sole 
evidence that Dent conspired to distribute crack rather 
than another form of cocaine base was Sergeant Cassidy's 
statement that the vials in Item 5 contained crack and Ali's 
testimony that crack generally is sold in vials or plastic 
bags. Although police seized six items of evidence from 
Dent and his co-conspirators, the court sentenced Dent 
based only on Items 2, 3 and 5. Cassidy characterized 
these items as follows: 
 
       Item number two is a clear glass plate with 
       approximately three grams of white chunky substance, 
       cocaine. Item number 3 is 17 clear plastic vials sealed 
       with red caps containing a white substance, 
       cocaine. . . . Item number 5 is five clear plastic 
       sandwich bags containing 23 each clear plastic vials 
       sealed with red caps containing a white substance, 
       crack. 
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Thus Cassidy's testimony indicates only that Item 5 
contained crack, rather than another form of cocaine base. 
 
Ali testified that all of the items contained cocaine base 
and stated only that she "mostly . . . see[s] crack in vials 
and ziplock baggies, and it comes in hard, chunky 
substance form, as compared to cocaine salt that comes in 
chunky powdered form and that can also be packed in 
ziplock baggies or heat-sealed baggies or in sandwich bags 
[sic] kind bags." When asked more specifically about 
whether the cocaine base she tested was crack, Ali testified 
that she has "very little experience or no experience at all" 
in distinguishing between different forms of cocaine base, 
and that she could not say whether the substance was 
crack. 
 
In Roman, 121 F.3d at 141, we held that precise chemical 
analysis is not necessary to prove that cocaine base is 
crack under the Sentencing Guidelines. There, the 
government had tested the cocaine base for traces of 
sodium bicarbonate, but found none. Id. The prosecution 
explained the absence of sodium bicarbonate by presenting 
evidence that if cocaine is cooked carefully, no sodium 
bicarbonate residue will remain in the finished crack. Id. 
Thus, the only evidence that the cocaine base was crack 
was the statement of a twelve-year veteran of the police 
force that it "was packaged in clear plastic vials with color 
caps, which is how crack is commonly packaged in the 
streets of Philadelphia." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Because the testifying officer had more than 
twelve years of experience with the Drug Enforcement 
Agency task force, had participated in more than 1000 
cases involving crack cocaine, attended training sessions on 
cocaine conducted by the Philadelphia police chemical lab 
and instructed other narcotics officers about identifying 
crack, we found his testimony "just barely" sufficient to 
meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. 
 
As we stated in Roman, ideally the government should 
aspire to provide a higher quality of proof than offered here. 
Id. at 141 n.4. Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that the 
district court abused its discretion by finding that the 
testimony of Cassidy and Ali satisfied the prosecution's 
burden of proof. Cassidy worked for the police force slightly 
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longer than the officer in Roman, and although he only 
testified that Item 5 contained crack, that item weighed 
5.803 grams and therefore suffices to support Dent's 
sentence. By her own admission, Ali has virtually no 
experience in distinguishing between crack and other forms 
of cocaine base. Thus, her testimony that the cocaine base 
taken from the table where Dent was seated was packaged 
using the method commonly used to pack crack for street 
sale has substantially less probative value than the 
statement of the investigating officer in Roman. 
Nonetheless, when combined with Officer Cassidy's 
testimony, it satisfies the government's burden of proof. 
 
V. 
 
We must also reject Dent's claim that the prosecution 
failed to prove the quantity of crack involved in his crime 
because it used an unreliable process to calculate the 
crack's weight. The drugs attributed to Dent were Item 2, a 
foil-wrapped lump of crack, and Items 3 and 5, both of 
which consisted of several vials of cocaine base. Tanweer 
Ali tested and weighed the single lump. She also 
individually weighed four of the seventeen vials from Item 3 
and eleven of the 115 vials in Item 5. She then used the 
actual weights of these sample vials to extrapolate the 
weights of the vials in Items 3 and 115 respectively. Ali also 
testified that the substance in all of the vials had the same 
general appearance. We upheld this weighing procedure in 
United State v. McCutchen, 992 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1993). 
There, we concluded that "[i]f a defendant challenges a drug 
quantity estimate based on an extrapolation from a test 
sample, the government must show, and the court must 
find, that there is an adequate basis in fact for the 
extrapolation and that the quantity was determined in a 
manner consistent with accepted standards of reliability." 
Id. at 25-26. This standard does not require that the 
government produce statistical evidence supporting its 
sampling techniques. Id. at 26. "Rather, reasonable 
reliability is the touchstone of the determination." Id. 
 
Here, the weight calculation was reasonably reliable 
because it was determined using an established procedure, 
the vials and their contents were substantially similar in 
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appearance, police seized all the drugs at the same time 
and place, and Ali randomly selected the vials weighed.2 See 
id.; United States v. Scalia, 993 F.2d 984, 989 (1st Cir. 
1993) ("[S]ufficient indicia of reliability may be found where 
a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that (1) a 
proper `random' selection procedure was employed; (2) the 
chemical testing method conformed with an accepted 
methodology; (3) the tested and untested samples were 
sufficiently similar in physical appearance; and (4) the 
tested and untested samples were contemporaneously 
seized at the search scene."). 
 
VI. 
 
Finally, we will affirm the district court's decision denying 
Dent's motion to subpoena Sergeant Cassidy's personnel 
files. Before trial, Dent's counsel allegedly learned that 
another drug case in which Cassidy was scheduled to 
testify had been dismissed amid allegations that Cassidy 
had committed misconduct in a drug investigation. 
Anticipating that Cassidy's personnel records could be used 
to impeach his credibility at trial, counsel sought to 
subpoena those records under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 17(c). After reviewing the personnel files in 
camera and concluding that they contained neither 
exculpatory evidence nor proper impeachment material, the 
district court granted the government's motion to quash the 
subpoena. See United States v. Dent, Cr. No. 92-223, slip 
op. at 6 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1997). 
 
We review the district court's denial of Dent's Rule 17(c) 
motion for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974). Thus we must uphold the district 
court's decision "unless it is clearly arbitrary or without 
support in the record." United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 
1135, 1145 (6th Cir. 1990). "Rule 17(c) was not intended to 
be a broad discovery device, and only materials that are 
`admissible as evidence' are subject to subpoena under the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Dent argues that Ali's method of selecting which vials to weigh was 
not random. We disagree with his characterization of Ali's testimony, 
because nothing indicates that she selectively chose which vials to weigh 
in a manner that would increase the estimated total weight. 
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rule." United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 192 (3d 
Cir. 1981). Thus although Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 
87-88 (1963), mandates that the prosecution disclose 
impeachment material that is exculpatory to the defendant, 
it does not require that the prosecution make thefile 
available for the defendant's general perusal. Instead, the 
government need only direct the custodian of thefiles to 
inspect them for exculpatory evidence and inform the 
prosecution of the results of that inspection, or, 
alternatively, submit the files to the trial court for in camera 
review. See United States v. Jennings, 960 F.2d 1488, 1492 
(9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825, 843 
(7th Cir. 1985). The district court's in camera inspection of 
Cassidy's personnel files fully satisfied Brady's due process 
requirements. Moreover, we cannot conclude that its 
determination that the files contained no impeachment or 
exculpatory material was clearly arbitrary or unsupported 
by the record. Accordingly, we hold that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion by granting the government's 
motion to quash Dent's subpoena of Cassidy's records. 
 
VII. 
 
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hereby 
affirm the district court's order in its entirety. 
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